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Abstract
In this paper, we consider two-state mean-field games and its dual for-
mulation. We then discuss numerical methods for these problems. Finally,
we present various numerical experiments, exhibiting different behaviours,
including shock formation, lack of invertibility, and monotonicity loss.
1 Introduction
The mean-field game framework is a flexible class of methods (see [LL06a,
LL06b, LL07, HMC06, HCM07]) with important applications in engineering,
economics and social sciences. In this paper, we focus primarily on two-state
problems. These problems are among the simplest mean-field models which,
nevertheless, have important applications. These include, for instance, appli-
cations to socio-economic sciences, such as paradigm shift or consumer choice
behavior [GVW14]. A variational perspective over two-state mean-field games
was explored in [Gom11]. Finite state mean-field games can be formulated as
systems of hyperbolic partial differential equations (see [Lio11, GMS13]). A
numerical method for these equations was introduced in [GVW14]. The key ob-
jective of this paper is to compare the outcome of different numerical schemes for
equivalent formulations of two-state mean-field games with a special emphasis
in qualitative properties such as shock formation, invertibility and monotonicity
loss.
Consider a system of N identical players or agents, which can switch between
two distinct states. Each player is in a state i ∈ I = {1, 2} and can choose a
switching strategy to the other state j ∈ I. The only information available to
each player, in addition to its own state, is the fraction θ1 and θ2 of players
he/she sees in the different states 1 and 2. We define the probability vector
θ = (θ1, θ2), θ ∈ P(I) = {θ ∈ R2 : θ1 + θ2 = 1, θ1, θ2 ≥ 0}. As shown
in [GMS13] the N player mean-field game system admits a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, in the limit N →∞, at least for short time, the value U i(θ, t) for
a player in state i, when the distribution of players among the different states
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is given by θ, satisfies the hyperbolic system
− U it (θ, t) =
2∑
j=1
gj(U, θ)
∂U i(θ, t)
∂θj
+ h(U, θ, i),
U(θ, T ) = UT (θ).
(1)
Here U i : P(I) × [0, T ] → R, g : R2 × P(I) → R2, h : R2 × P(I) × I → R,
U iT : P(I) → R and i ∈ I = {1, 2}. The characteristics for (1) are a system of
a finite state Hamilton-Jacobi equation, coupled with a transport equation for
a probability measure, see [GMS13].
Motivated by the detailed discussion in [Lio11], we consider the dual equation
to (1), which is 
Θit(υ, t) = gi(υ,Θ) +
2∑
j=1
h(υ,Θ, j)
∂Θi(υ, t)
∂υj
,
Θ(υ, T ) = ΘT (υ),
(2)
where Θi : R2 × [0, T ] → R, ΘiT : R2 → R and i ∈ I = {1, 2}. For certain
classes of finite state mean-field games, called potential mean-field games, both
(1) and (2) can be regarded as gradients of a Hamilton-Jacobi equation [Lio11,
GMS13]. Thanks to a special reduction discussed in this paper, this gradient
structure can be used to study a wide range of two-state problems.
2 Statement of the problem
We begin by presenting the set up for two-state mean-field game problems. We
assume that all players have the same running cost determined by a function
c : I × P(I) × (R+0 )2 → R as well as an identical terminal cost UT (θ),
which is Lipschitz continuous in θ. The running cost c(i, θ, α) depends on the
state i ∈ I = {1, 2} of the player, the mean-field θ, that is the distribution of
players among states, and on the switching rate α. As in [GMS13], we suppose
that c is Lipschitz continuous in θ, with a Lipschitz constant (with respect to
θ) bounded independently of α. Let the running cost c be differentiable with
respect to α, and ∂c∂α (i, θ, α) be Lipschitz with respect to θ, uniformly in α. We
assume that for each i, the running cost c(i, θ, α) does not depend on the i-th
coordinate αi of α. Additional assumptions on c are:
(A1) For i = 1, 2, θ ∈ P(I), α, α′ ∈ (R+0 )2, with αj 6= α′j , for some j 6= i and
γ > 0,
c(i, θ, α ′)− c(i, θ, α) ≥ ∂c(i, θ, α)
∂α
· (α ′ − α) + γ‖α ′ − α‖2.
(A2) The function c is superlinear on αj , j 6= i, that is,
lim
αj→∞
c(i, θ, α)
‖α‖ → ∞, j ∈ {1, 2}.
The generalized Legendre transform of c is given by
h(z, θ, i) = min
µ∈(R+0 )2
c(i, θ, µ) + µ ·∆iz, (3)
with z = (z1, z2) and ∆i(ϕ
1, ϕ2) =
(
ϕ1 − ϕi, ϕ2 − ϕi), with ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) ∈ R2.
The point where the minimum is achieved in (3) is denoted by α∗:
α∗j (z, θ, i) = arg min
µ∈(R+0 )d
c(i, θ, µ) + µ ·∆iz, for j 6= i. (4)
If h is differentiable with respect to z we have
α∗j (∆iz, θ, i) =
∂h (∆iz, θ, i)
∂zj
, for j 6= i. (5)
For convenience and consistency with (5), we require
α∗1(z, θ, i) = −α∗2(z, θ, i). (6)
When the total number of players N goes to infinity, we have the description
of the Nash equilibrium given by the value function U satisfying the hyperbolic
system (1) where the function g is given by
gj(z, θ) = θ1 α
∗
j (z, θ, 1) + θ2 α
∗
j (z, θ, 2).
Note that this yields g1(z, θ) = − g2(z, θ) by using (6). Furthermore, from (3)
and (4), we have that both h(z, θ, i) and g(z, θ) depend only on the difference
z1 − z2.
2.1 Reduced primal problem
We can explore the particular structure of (1) for two-state problems to trans-
form it into a scalar problem. Observe that θ is a probability vector, so
we rewrite θ as θ = (θ1, θ2) = (ζ, 1 − ζ), ζ ∈ [0, 1]. Let U be a C1 solu-
tion to (1). Because h(z, θ, i) depends only on the differences of the coor-
dinates of z, we define w(ζ, t) = U1(ζ, 1 − ζ, t) − U2(ζ, 1 − ζ, t), and set
wT (ζ) = U
1
T (ζ, 1− ζ)−U2T (ζ, 1− ζ). Thus, the hyperbolic system (1) is reduced
to a scalar equation called the reduced primal equation, (see [GVW14]):
− wt(ζ, t) + r(w, ζ) ∂ζw(ζ, t) = q(w, ζ), (7)
where
r(w, ζ) = −g1(w, 0, ζ, 1− ζ),
q(w, ζ) = h(w, 0, ζ, 1− ζ, 1)− h(w, 0, ζ, 1− ζ, 2),
and ∂w∂ζ denotes
∂w
∂ζ =
(
∂
∂θ1
− ∂∂θ2
) (
U1 − U2) |(ζ,1−ζ). Note that (7) is supple-
mented with the terminal condition w(ζ, T ) = wT (ζ), and since r(w, 0) ≤ 0 and
r(w, 1) ≥ 0 no further boundary conditions are required.
2.2 Dual problem
Next we present a transformation introduced by Lions [Lio11] to convert system
(1) into an equivalent system of linear PDEs. This procedure is related to the
hodograph transformation (see for instance [Eva98]), an often used technique
to convert certain nonlinear PDEs into a linear PDE by interchanging the de-
pendent and independent variables. Note that this transformation is similar to
the generalized coordinate techniques in classical Hamiltonian dynamics.
For fixed time t, we consider the function U(θ, t), solution to (1), mapping from
an open set of R2 into R2 and its inverse Θ(υ, t) = (Θ1(υ, t),Θ2(υ, t)), defined
by
Θ(U(θ, t), t) = θ.
Using (1) we obtain that Θ(υ, t) satisfies the dual system (2).
2.3 Reduced dual problem
We now apply a similar reduction procedure to the dual problem. This reduction
transforms the dual system (2) into a scalar equation. Let υ˜ = υ1 − υ2. We
consider the set where Θ1 + Θ2 = 1 and deduce that
Θ1t = g1(υ˜, 0,Θ
1, 1−Θ1) + h(υ˜, 0,Θ1, 1−Θ1, 1) ∂Θ
1
∂υ1
+ h(υ˜, 0,Θ1, 1−Θ1, 2) ∂Θ
1
∂υ2
.
Next, we look for solutions depending only on υ˜, that is, Θ1(υ1, υ2, t) = Z(υ˜, t).
The equation for Z is given by
Zt = [h(υ˜, 0, Z, 1− Z, 1)− h(υ˜, 0, Z, 1− Z, 2)] ∂Z
∂υ˜
+ g1(υ˜, 0, Z, 1− Z),
which can be rewritten as
− Zt(υ˜, t) + q(υ˜, Z) ∂Z
∂υ˜
= r(υ˜, Z). (8)
Equation (8) is supplemented with the boundary conditions: lim
υ˜→−∞
Z(υ˜, t) = 1
and lim
υ˜→+∞
Z(υ˜, t) = 0. These are motivated by the following considerations: if
υ˜ is very negative, the best state in terms of utility function is state 1. Hence
all players would switch to it. Similarly, if υ˜ is very large, then all players will
switch to state 2.
2.4 Potential mean-field games
We now consider a special class of mean-field games, called potential mean-field
games, in which system (1) can be written as the gradient of a Hamilton-Jacobi
equation. Suppose that
h(z, θ, i) = h˜(z, i) + f(i, θ), i ∈ {1, 2}. (9)
Such functions h that admit the decomposition as in (9) will be called separable
throughout this paper. We will show in this section that separable mean-field
games are potential. We are not aware of other classes of potential mean-
field games. Separable mean-field games occur naturally in many problems.
Various examples in the realm of socio-economic sciences were discussed in
[GVW14]. In this section, we suppose also that f(i, θ) =
∂F (θ)
∂θi
, for some
potential F : R2 → R. Define H : R2 × P(I)→ R by
H(z, θ) = θ1 h˜(∆1z, 1) + θ2 h˜(∆2z, 2) + F (θ). (10)
Let Ψ0 : R2 → R be a continuous function and consider a smooth enough
solution Ψ : R2 × [0, T ]→ R of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation−
∂Ψ(θ, t)
∂t
= H (∂θΨ, θ) ,
Ψ(θ, T ) = ΨT (θ).
(11)
Setting U j(θ, t) =
∂Ψ(θ, t)
∂θj
we obtain that
−U it = g1(U, θ)
∂U i
∂θ1
+ g2(U, θ)
∂U i
∂θ2
+ h˜(∆iU, i) +
∂F (θ)
∂θi
,
and deduce that U i solves the PDE in (1).
2.5 Reduced potential mean-field games - I
Note that the reduction to the scalar case performed in section 2.1 can also be
done in the potential case. Once again, set θ = (ζ, 1− ζ), ζ ∈ [0, 1], and define
ΥT (ζ) = ΨT (ζ, 1− ζ).
Consider Υ : [0, 1]× [0, T ]→ R solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation−
∂Υ(ζ, t)
∂t
= H˜(∂ζΥ, ζ),
Υ(ζ, T ) = ΥT (ζ),
(12)
where H˜ : R× [0, 1]→ R has the form
H˜(∂ζΥ, ζ) = ζ h˜(∂ζΥ, 0, 1) + (1− ζ) h˜(∂ζΥ, 0, 2) + F (ζ, 1− ζ). (13)
Then Ψ(ζ, 1− ζ, t) = Υ(ζ, t) solves (11).
The natural boundary conditions for (12), taking into account that ζ ∈ [0, 1],
are the state constrained boundary conditions, as discussed in [GVW14]. These
can be implemented in practice by taking large Dirichlet data for the boundary
values of Υ at ζ = 0, 1. A solution to the reduced primal system can be addressed
via the reduced potential system by setting wp =
∂Υ(ζ, t)
∂ζ
and observing that
wp is a solution to (7).
2.6 Reduced potential mean-field games - II
Proposition 2.1. A separable two-state mean-field game has an associated re-
duced equation that admits a potential.
Proof. Observing the expression of q(w, ζ) in the reduced primal formulation
and using the fact that h is separable we obtain:
q(w, ζ) =
[
h˜(w, 0, 1)− h˜(w, 0, 2)
]
+ [f(1, ζ)− f(2, ζ)] .
Since we are dealing with a problem in one dimension, f(1, ζ) − f(2, ζ) is the
derivative of some potential F˜ : R → R. So, without any additional assump-
tions, we conclude that the reduced equation admits a potential.
2.7 Potential formulation for dual systems
Suppose (9) holds and let H be given by (10). Fix VT : R2 → R of class C1
and take V : R2 × [0, T ]→ R as a smooth solution to the dual Hamilton-Jacobi
equation 
∂V (υ, t)
∂t
= H(υ, ∂υV ),
V (υ, T ) = VT (υ).
(14)
Note that analogously to the primal case, the function Θ(υ, t) = DυV (υ, t)
solves the PDE in (2).
2.8 Reduced Potential for dual systems
As in the previous reduced cases, suppose
VT (υ
1, υ2) = ΦT (υ
1 − υ2).
Define Φ(υ˜, t) to be a solution to
∂Φ(υ˜, t)
∂t
= H˜(υ˜, ∂υ˜Φ),
Φ(υ˜, T ) = ΦT (υ˜),
(15)
where H˜ : R× [0, 1]→ R has the form
H˜(υ˜, ∂υ˜Φ) = ∂υ˜Φ h˜(υ˜, 0, 1) + (1− ∂υ˜Φ) h˜(υ˜, 0, 2) + F (∂υ˜Φ, 1− ∂υ˜Φ).
Then, it follows that V (υ1, υ2, t) = Φ(υ1 − υ2, t) solves the PDE in (14).
The boundary conditions associated to the dual problem suggest we should take
boundary conditions for Φ that are asymptotically linear. More precisely,
lim
υ˜→−∞
∂Φ(υ˜, t)
∂υ˜
= 1 and lim
υ˜→+∞
∂Φ(υ˜, t)
∂υ˜
= 0.
Furthermore, a solution to the reduced dual equation can be constructed via
the reduced potential dual equation (15) by taking Zp =
∂Φ(υ˜,t)
∂υ˜ , and observing
that Zp solves the reduced dual equation (8).
2.9 Legendre transform
Using the Legendre transform as in [Lio11], one can relate the various terminal
conditions for (1), (2), (11), and (14).
To do so, we fix a convex function ΨT (θ) and the corresponding solution Ψ(θ, t)
of (11). Then U(θ, t) =
∂Ψ(θ, t)
∂θ
solves (1) with terminal data UT (θ) =
∂ΨT (θ)
∂θ
.
To define the corresponding solutions to (2) and (14) we consider the Legendre
transform VT of ΨT :
VT (υ) = sup
θ
υ · θ −ΨT (θ).
So, by the usual properties of the Legendre transform, under sufficient regularity
and convexity assumptions, the inverse of the map θ 7→ ∂ΨT (θ)∂θ is υ 7→ ∂VT (υ)∂υ .
Furthermore, as observed before, if we take the solution V of (14) with terminal
data VT , its gradient Θ(υ, t) =
∂V (υ,t)
∂υ solves (2). Hence, the terminal data
ΘT is the inverse of UT and, at least for t close enough to T , Θ(υ, t) is also the
inverse of U(θ, t), by the properties discussed previously. Besides, at least for t
close enough to T , Ψ(θ, t) is the Legendre transform of V (υ, t).
3 Examples and numeric simulations
Consider a two-state mean-field game, where the fraction of players in either
state, 1 or 2, is given by θi, i = 1, 2 with θ1 + θ2 = 1, and θi ≥ 0. Suppose the
running cost c = c(i, θ, µ) in (4) depends quadratically on the switching rate µ,
i.e.,
c(i, θ, µ) = f(i, θ) + c0(i, µ), (16)
with c0(i, µ) =
1
2
2∑
j 6=i
µ2j . Then h and g1 take the form
h(z, θ, 1) = f(1, θ)− 1
2
(
(z1 − z2)+)2 ;
h(z, θ, 2) = f(2, θ)− 1
2
(
(z2 − z1)+)2 ; (17)
g1(z, θ) = − θ1
(
z1 − z2)+ + θ2 (z2 − z1)+ . (18)
Note that if the function f is a gradient field, i.e. f = ∇F , the two-state problem
is a potential mean-field game, cf. section 2.4. In this case, for z = (z1, z2) ∈ R2,
(10) is given by
H(z, θ) = F (θ1, θ2)−
θ1
(
(z1 − z2)+)2 + θ2 ((z2 − z1)+)2
2
.
3.1 Some reduced systems
Finally, we discuss the particular formulation of equation (7) as well as the
numerical simulations for different examples. Since h is given by (17) and g by
(18), we can rewrite the reduced equations for the primal and dual systems, as
well for their potential versions. The reduced primal system becomes
−wt(ζ, t)− (1− 2ζ)|w| − w
2
∂w(ζ, t)
∂ζ
=
1
2
|w| w − [f(1, ζ, 1− ζ)− f(2, ζ, 1− ζ)]
The reduced dual system reads as
−Zt(υ˜, t) +
(
f(1, Z)− f(2, Z)− 1
2
|υ˜|υ˜
)
∂Z(υ˜, t)
∂υ˜
=
(1− 2Z)|υ˜| − υ˜
2
.
The H˜ given by (13) is
H˜(υ˜, ζ) = − (υ˜
−)2 + ζ|υ˜|υ˜
2
+ F (ζ, 1− ζ).
And their potential versions are given respectively by:
−∂Υ(ζ, t)
∂t
= −1
2

[(
∂Υ
∂ζ
)−]2
+ ζ
∣∣∣∣∂Υ∂ζ
∣∣∣∣ ∂Υ∂ζ
+ F (ζ, 1− ζ),
Υ(ζ, T ) = ΥT (ζ),
the reduced potential formulation for the primal problem, and
∂Φ(υ˜, t)
∂t
= −1
2
[(
υ˜−
)2
+
∂Φ
∂υ˜
|υ˜| υ˜
]
+ F
(
∂Φ
∂υ˜
, 1− ∂Φ
∂υ˜
)
,
Φ(υ˜, T ) = ΦT (υ˜),
the reduced potential formulation for the dual problem.
3.2 Computational experiments
Finally we compare the numerical simulations of the primal, dual and potential
mean-field game for different examples. Let ζ ∈ I denote the fraction of players
being in state 1. We discretize the domain [0, 1] into N = 200 equidistant
intervals. The time steps are set to ∆t = 10−5, if not stated otherwise.
We solve the primal problem using the numerical discretization introduced in
[GVW14]. The corresponding potential mean-field game, the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation (11), is solved using Godunov’s method. The simulations of its dual
formulation, i.e. equation (8), are based on a finite difference scheme using an
upwind discretization for the convection term.
Example I - shock formation In our first example, we solve (7) by setting
the terminal data to
w(ζ, T = 5) = 2ζ − 1
and the running costs, as in (16), to
f(1, θ) = 1− θ1 and f(2, θ) = 1− θ2.
Hence F (θ) = θ1θ2. We observe the formation of a shock in the primal version
as well as in its corresponding potential version, see Figure 1. A boundary layer
can also be seen in the dual variable Z. This results from the discontinuities of
Z(υ˜, T ) at the boundary due to the limiting boundary conditions.
Example II - monotonicity loss In our second example, we illustrate the
behavior of solutions when w loses its monotone behavior. In this case, the
function is not invertible any more, hence we expect different shocks in the dual
variable.
We choose
F (θ) = κ θ21θ
2
2, κ ∈ R+.
Then f(1, θ) = 2κ θ21θ2 and f(2, θ) = 2κ θ1θ
2
2. The terminal conditions are set
to
w(ζ, T = 0.25) = 2ζ − 1.
We clearly observe the loss of monotonicity of w at time t = 0 in Figure 3. In
this case, it is not possible to invert the function w any more. The formation of
a discontinuity is also visible in the evolution for Z.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the dual formulation for finite state mean-field
games with particular emphasis on two-state problems where various reductions
and simplifications are possible. In particular, we have shown that any sepa-
rable two-state mean-field game admits a potential. Additionally, the analysis
of the boundary conditions for these problems was carried out in detail. We
have illustrated numerically the connection between shock formation, in one
formulation, with the monotonicity loss in its dual formulation. For potential
mean-field games, this corresponds to convexity/concavity loss of the associated
potential functions.
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(a) w - Solution to the Primal problem at times t = 0 and t = 5.
(b) Z - Solution to the Dual problem.
(c) Zoom of Z - Dual solution.
Figure 1: Simulations for Example I.
(a) Solution to the Reduced Primal (wp) via
the Reduced Potential Primal (Υ) at time
t = 0.
(b) Reduced Potential (Φ) for the Dual Prob-
lem at time t = 0.
(c) Comparison of the solutions w, wp to the
primal problem at time t = 0.
(d) Comparison of the solutions z and zp to the
dual problem at time t = 0.
Figure 2: Simulations for Example I.
(a) w - Solution Primal problem.
(b) Z - Solution Dual problem.
(c) Zoom of Z - Dual Solution.
Figure 3: Simulations for Example II.
